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As in much or"southern ;nd Eastern Africa, the maize marketing system iri. South· 
Africa is largely controlled by_ a government parastatal, the Maize Board~ Although th~ past_ 
decade has-seen several reforms in Soutp Africa's single channel maize marketing .system, 
market reform has not received tlie urgent .attention that it has irr,,,otlrer countries of the . 
. ) -
region~ "fhis is despite evidence that, even in normal ra:infa1l years, large numbers of So_uih 
African consumers are "food insecurc."1 There is considerable evidence that; despite record 
maize harvests in the late 1980's, diro[lic prote'in-energy malnutrition.is 'ville:spread among 
. rural black schoolchildren; affecting 25 to 40. percent of the population (UNICEF, 1989) . 
. Tlier~ are several possible reasons for the lack of pressures for mai·keting reform . · 
· under such circumstances. First, the :unique nature of South Africars politieal environment 
bas limited iiwolvementby international donor iustitutions. This has meant that_tlie impetus ·. 
for reform can only come from within, not from "outside" as has usually been the case in the 
r.egion. Second, there is a widespread perception within South Africa that the Maize lfoard 
ha:s been a rel(,ltively efficient institution. PrnpOJlerits of tilt~ single-channel marketing system -
point to the considerabl'e degree of price and (producer_Jncoine stability thm has prevailed 
. and contrast the curren_t situation to" the "free market" price disasters1 of the 1930's tliat 
precipitated the creation of the Maize Iloard. - . 
. This paper, while accepting these lwo explam~tions; suggests that' there. is a third 
interpretation· of _the apparent Jack of a -true· reform impulse: South Africa's- maize 
marketing system, like many such systems in Africa, was designed to meet the needs of a 
particular group o( market participants, flamely white commerdal formers atid ·large-scale 
maize· millers. Since to date, the marketing system--has met these needs, there is little 
impetus for change, especially ·given the rigillities pf the current political system. Ill this 
view, significant reforms of the 11rnize marketing system will only occur when repre_sentatives 
of the disenfranchised majority obtain a -degree of control over the conduct of iigricultural 
.policy in· South Africa., Given the rapid pace o.f politic,al reform and the apparent 
comptitmen:t to broader participation in governme11t policy making, withiri-·the ·next few . 
- years there. will likely be increased focus 011 options for reform of. the- maize marketing . 
-~ system. In parti~ular, there may be substantial scope for addressing the "food fosecurity. 
· . paradox" and raising rural incomes through select reforms of the maize marketing system. 
· Dy drawing on the -availµblc literature, ili.terviews with knowledgeable market -
partiCipanfs and South African academics,- and the experience of other Southern African 
nations, this paper atfompts to. identify the emerging policy issues in the maize sub-sector 
ai1d outline an agenda for future research. · · · · 
_.-
1 1\S Rukuni and Eicher (1985) have poirited out, food security 
has two key components:. national food availability and food access· -
-by in~ividuals. Food access failures permit the coexistence of 
large national grain surpluses and malnutrition. 
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I. Maire prodllgiion ;md price. policy in South Afriai 
In South Africa, the total area planted to maize has steadily declined over the last 
decade. For example, area planted declined from 4.3 million hectares in 1980/81 to·3.0 
million hectares in 1991/92 (Ma!3e Board, 1992). Falling real producer prices are generally. 
blamed for this erosion in area planted. Over· the past five years, inflation has been running 
at 15-20 percent, while the Maize Board buying price has only increased by about 10 percent 
per year (Maize Board, 1992). Due to producer price increases and concerted government 
efforts for the 1992/93 growing season, maize plantings did increase to 3.44 million hectares, 
with 1.87 million hectares devoted to white maize and 1.57 million hectares devoted to 
yellow maize. However, the severe drought in the Southern African region severely reduced 
yields and production fell to 3.5 million metric tonnes, down from 7.3 million tonnes in· 
1990/91 and 11.5 million tonnes in 1989/90 (Financial Gazette, 1992)_. As a consequence, 
South Africa plans to import over 4.5 million tonnes of maize during the 1992/93 marketing 
year. In a normal year, the domestic demand is about 7.3 mill~on metric tonnes. 
Maize .Production is divided fairly evenly between white and yellow maize. During 
1990/91, A.36 million metric tonnes of white mg.ize were produced compm:ed to 3.98 million 
metric tonnes of yellow maize. For the last two 1,narketing seasons, there has been no 
difference in the producer prices ~or white maize and yellow maize. Even in the 1989 /90 
marketing year, the white maize producer price was only 3 percent higher than the yellow -
maize producer price. Yell ow maize -yields are often higher than those of. white maize, 
although based on the experience of growers in South Africa and the existing hybrids now 
in use the maximum yield differential between yellow and.while is about 10 percent (Elliott, 
1992). -
_ _}'he maintenance of price stability has been the major challenge of the Maize Board. 
As in much of the region, South African farming areas are drought-prone. Without crucial 
rainfall in January and Febr_uary, when tasselling takes place, production can be severely 
affected. Maize prke setting, as carried out by the Maize Board, is a co_mplex task. In 
, I . 
essence, the Maize Board has a graduated pricing system. Each August, a price scenario 
is announced for the coming planting season that links a gi_ven nati~l crop to a.particular 
producer price. For example, in 1991/92, a 6.5 million metric tonne crop was linked to a 
producer price of R387 per tonne, wbile a bumper harvest of 11 million metric tonnes would 
have meant a producer price of only R287_ per tonne. The price and crop scenarios 
developed by the Maize· Board are based on variables such as expected demand, projected 
interest and inflation rates, export price trends and the Board's budget· situation. By 
October or November, farmers mu.st decide how much to plant, based on the price ai1d crop· 
scenarios and predictions about the weather. In March of the following year, once the size 
of the crop is known, Maize Board buying and selling prices for the marketilig year are 
announced. · · · 
Producer prices are set by the Maize Board and are pan-territorial and pan-seasonal. 
The Maize Board also utilizing a computer-based "least cost" model that is used to manage 
the complex task of distdbuting and allocating Maize Board stocks fo a manner that 
minimizes the Board's. transport and storage costs. Maize prices for the 1990/91·marketing 
year are outlined in Table 1. 
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Table 1:-MaiZe ·Prices_;(Rand i)er metric tonne)_,._-:-; _ ~_: ... _~·: __ _ 
-- . - · .. , .:- ·~ 
.. , - . . I -. -.·. _1990/91, ma,rkctirig.:year 
~- - ' r- whl1e -_ ~--_- [i __ ·: . ·~:,.-~ ¢~l~Yf-. ; . 
·Maize Board producer price (includii1g' :;· -3U2:6T · 39?·~7;. · 
supplementary payri1ents)' .. ~' '. i ' .'': : _.,·'' ., __ - ••. 
' .., • - • /; ' - • ", ~ '~ : ~ • : •• .'"'!" ~ L ) • •. ~ _· ~ . ' 
·. ·, '· 
... -:---
''- .. 
·.,. 
. r· .·. ~ 
· 360.00·· .Maize_-Board selling:pricc (best :gr:ades)- -, , 393.00~ _ 
; - •: .' ~·==================-=========· ==-·::::-·:=-=-==~=====================.I 
;_ ·- - For· much oCLlre-J980s; S_outl1Afrlca-was bne of the few:courildcs- in-tjie regioh~to 
post frequeilt ihaize surpluses~·-nowever;·the.'expoi"t'possibilities o~:tlie Maize)3oard ar~ (.-· 
limited· since South Africa :has·11ot beeit:.able lo: pro£j(ab1y ·expofl · qutside :the'S-oullier11 
· . African_ region given· recerit 'do;n1l'.stic·· and. ihternational pri~es. Higli .. traiis1)C.frr cost!{ ·fo 
overseas ~markets and large- pro~lticer suhsidies,:,.paid 'by' the. EEC aiid -U~S: li1it~'t-.-the agility' 
ofSouth Africa· to export maize~as stockfecds."'Regiomil markets in \vh~te,maiz~ are"Jiniited~·-. 
- The occurrence of bumper harvests ·ge1ierally· t~nd to coir1dde~ iii the··-region:;~vhen Soiith --
African maize producers expedet1cc· 'go:Od: :harvests; ·so do:·many other· p'roclucers ·]rt 
:peighbouring ·countries. However~ in _1991, -So-µ th Africa was· a~ble to -_exporFa significant 
ari10unt of white maize to 11eighboring.'Africa11 ·n-a:tfons·'at-a profit. ' '. ·;. ---~ 
~ ' '• , ·.·::.~_·. ,_,.; ~~,~. 
ll··Maii¢ markeliag_ · '.'- _ . ,; ·. · .'> ~'-
A'i ·iii many Southern African ··cpuntries, South Africa is divided into geographic3,l · -
· eritiliesthat govern n14ize movements- and inaize-~;ales by producers. s·ouH1 AfiiCais divided·. 
into· Area "A,n Are~\ '·'B," .an.d the "exempted :ar~a." · Area "A" c·oniprises the.' 1'.ransvri:al -
province; the Orahge Fre·e ~t:.ite prov!ncei· a1ld- selected.distr~cts in the Ctipe Prqvince··:ai1d ' ._ 
Natal province. ·The bulk· ·or th~ mition"s marketed r inaize is produced-fit' this' ar¢a: . · 
Produ~ers in Area "All must sell -their m:aize to the Maize Board , its age6ts;· regisfor·ed 
, miller trnders or ~ml.;tisers of yellow 1'11aiz'e~ ---"Miller traders" are commercial inillei~hluit are 
/' registered witli the Maize Ilpard to buy inaize directly from producers'. ~.Althdtigliend-users 
of.yeJlow maize, such a5_.stockfce<lers, caii buy directly froln producers~ th~)· ir!ust paf~ . - · 
prescribed le.Vy to the Maize Board (Maize Bo'ard, 1991). _ , - : -- · : · _: :: : : · . '-. ': _· · -
_ _Area "B"-comprises the-rc'rimirii11g distiids in 'the Cape Provfoce and, tbe'proviil'ce bf · 
Natal. Producers fo,Area "B'~ must seU. their maize 'to either the.Maize ·b(iard; registere~ 
maize. traders,- and r'egist~re<l miller ttaders. -·Registered maize traders- btiy. ri1aiie for their 
--owiu1ccount at prices tliatu).ay' not ue less than the ptipes fixed for _Arca"A:"'. Tn\ders_h.re 
required· to proviue rimrithly rettirns.-of thefr transactions to the MaiZc Board arid pay a' levy· .. 
·or pttrchases of prmJ~icer maize (_Maize Board, 'i991). . . . · ·:·· · ·~-' :. ·'_. 
. . _ Thy rest of South.Africa- and the· so:-called.''ho.mel:mds" are cxem1>folhfr¢~s:iu wh_i~l! 
_: · _ produ~ers can sell Lo imy perscfo withhrthe. area at m1y price:· However~ ~iii~e niostof ff)~ 
· · marketed ·maize is produced ·in.'_confrolled ·areas (i.e. ~rea "A" and j~r'ea' "B"), the- Maize 
. -Board has virtuaHy:complete ~ontrol over the disposal of all maize rna:rkefod ·in .th(country~ 
. ' . . . : ·.-: : _- ,~ : ,. .. " :.-
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lli. Maire Jnilling . 
Maize mi1ling in South Affica is dominated by a cornmercial milling industry that 
comprises over 60 firms. The sheer' number of milling firms leads m~ny ·to believe that 
there is a significant degree of cmnpetition in the·milling industry (Elliott, 1992) .. Y~ the· 
two largest firms, Tiger Milling ~nd Premier Milling, each have approximately 20 p~rcent 
bf the maize meal market. There is ·a coriunbn perception that the milling industry is 
operating far below capacity. Most millers operate ,011ly one shift. It has been estimated 
that the nation's total milling capacity is only about 25 perce11t utilized (Financial M.ail, 
.J 
· 1991). . . . . . . . .. . . . . 
111e extraction rates, -mininium and maximum oil and fiber content, and particle size: 
·of maize meal -must conform to industry standards. Four types of maize meal are produced 
by millers: . . _ · 
1) "super"-(or' "fine"), a highly refined, degermed product with a 62.5 percent 
extraction rate; 
,;special si1fted, "' a rcfinyd prodµct with an extraction rate 
of78.7 percent. Special sifted comprises over half of the 111aize meal market 
2) 
. ' 
and is sometimes enriched with proteins and vitamins; , 
3) "sifted,;' a less refined. product, with an 88.7 percent extraction rate; and 
4) . "unsifted" or_ "strnight-run," an. unrefined meal with an' extractien ·rate of over: 98 
. percent. 
) , 
. . ) . . . ' . . ' . 
A range· of other maize grain products are also manufactured for specialize9 uses_ 
including: samp, halved or quartered maize -kernels with all the bran and germ ren1oved; 
maize rice, rice..:like particles •Of 2 mnl to 3 mm produced from the hard endosperm of the 
maize kernel; maize grits, a. product with a very low· oil content used primarily in the 
manufacture· of traditional beer; and 1i1~ize flour, primarily used by the :baking industry. 
. . Interestingly, despite the diversity of maize meal products on the market, there is not 
a great deal of price differentiation· between meal. of differer1t pro_cessing types. In April 
1992, the maximum differential between the che~pest type of meat· (straight-run) and the 
.· u1ost expensiv~-"super" was only 30 percent. . · 
· Although the max1nuim prices at which maize could be sold by. millers were-fixed by 
the Maize Board until 1971, there ate ci.urently no restrictions on retail maize irfeal prices. 
·.·Price ·controls were lifted because the Maize board was cqnvinced· that the degree . of ·. 
competition existing. in. the industry dt1e to excess capacity would prevent large 'price 
increases.·. The :Maiz~ ._Boai'cl conducts regular s1irveys 6r the ex-mill and retail maize meal 
· price:s ·in order· to determine when consuiners are ';exploited." 'Apparently no eviden.ce of. 
such activity has be~p found to date (Maize Board, 1991). . · ._ 
However, a comparison of tl}e average milling and, retailing margin in South Africa 
with govemment .. set milling ~nd retailing margin' i_n Zimbal?we reveals an interesting 
paradox. . In Zimbabwe, the ]nilling rndustry IS quite conc~ntrated. ' There are four -
· commercial maize millers,) and the largest firm has over 65 per~ent of the national market. 
· . In South Africa, there are many mpre milling firms and, one would expect, a much more 
competitive milling and retailing structure. However, the total rililling and retailing margin 
in So_uth Africa is over twice the. margin in Zimbabwe (see Table Z). . · 
·s 
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· Table 2: Comparison of White Maize Marlee ting and Milliiig. Margins · in South 
----: Africa and ZimbabWe, in :Mebic Tonnes · 
(ci>nverte~ to U.S. dollars}2 r-
.. A. Parastatal producer price · 
B. Parnstatal selling price 
. C_:o Ex-mill price, with no govt subsidy 
D. _-Retail price for 80%. extraction rate 
m~~\l,_ with no govt subsidy ' 
. ' -
E. Retail price .for 80% extraction rate 
meal, including govt subsidy 
F. Maize millers margin (D-1riinus "B) 
· I April 1992 I 
:'l=I ==_ ~so=u=th:;:=A;::fr==1;:::. ca=_ == .. ;=1=-=_ ===z::::im=:=b:::;ab;;::;w=· e==~]'' 
US$ 115 , -US$ 110 
US$ 166 ·US$ 138 
US$ 342 US$ 210 · 
·US$ 370· US$ 233. 
US$ 155 
US$ 176 US$ 72 -
Fo(Zimbabwe,. the government-set ma.Ximum ex-mill and retail "ro_iler meal" pric~s_ 
were used in _the calculation ·in Table 2. Roller meal ~in Zinibabwe_ has an approxirriate . 
. . .. / . . 
. extraction rate of 82-85 percent. . For South _Arrica, where there are no maximum retail· 
prices for m;iize meal, the Premier Milling. ex-mill price of "special sifted" maize meal was· _ 
D;Sed.-The retaiJ_price of '-'special'sifted;' was _obtained by averaging the observed ret1\ii price_· 
in three Jarge chain supermark~ts in Johannesburg a_nd Pretoda. RetaH prkes in rural 
-· outlets in South Africa would uiidoubtedly fie even higher. _ · 
_ There are-· severat' possible- explari~ttions for this apparent paradox· hi marketing . 
. rimrgins. One~ or"two· of the largest millers may act as "price leadet:s" with the smaller· 
-n1illers following this price leadership. .However, -it is not clear what mechanisms would- . 
prevent price discounts PY sm4ller milie'rs to gain a: greater-market share, particularly 1f 
. there is under-utilized capacity.· ·Price leadership or collusion at th~ retail l_cvel does ·riot 
appear plausible given the number.of large retail chains and smaller grocery shops. Another 
-possible explanation is that produc-tfon ·co~ts are higher in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. 
. I 
Maize millers in South Africa- tend 'to h~ive newer ~quipment atid face higher labour costs. 
Transpott and energy costs may also be-:higher. Clearly; this paradox needs further _ . 
. . - investigatidn ~is it is difficult to make inferen~es about the impact of m~trkef structure on . - -..., 
' - . 
·
2 
_Assuming 1us$=2.-a-o .'Rand and 1US$=5.o -ZIM$. Given that the 
Zimbabwe dollar· 1s likely to be overvalued by 20 to· '40 percent, 
_'this· calculation may- overstate . the Zimbabw.ean . maize_ price -
. structure,< although comparisons of~ the re_lative magnitude of 
. margin's. is s:till valid. - -
6 
' ' 
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' ' -
. - ' ;- ' ' f,_,_, -- -' . ' _; .:;~~',-_'_- ·;:, -_, ·~---· ' ' -
producf pricing- based oil .a· ~~pid appra!sat':ahd ~dimited number of observations. 
t • . . 
IV. Maize consumption _ _ 
Maize is t11e st_aple food oLthe -bulk of.the .population in_ South Africa. - It is 
consumed primarily as'a thin bre/akfast por.ridge.a_nd'a-thiCkstiff pprridge with the evening 
meal. According .to data from 'the MaiZe_, Bo~rd/that categorizes maize consumption by 
racial groupings, plac~ consumers -account: for. -94' pei:cerit ()f the -maize meal consumed· 
(Maize Board, J992).- - For rural consumers iii' tl~~s ''group, maize products account for 53 
percent of all carbohydrates, while maize ·:products account for' 40 . per(:ent of all 
·carbohydrates consurned by urbari consumers in: this; grouping (Elliott, 1991)., -
- - "lVfaize consµmptio1r is- 'P~imarily- a- rural :-phenomenon as' over 70 percent 'of white-
maize is sold in n1ral areas. ·Per capita coll~_ilqjptiol\ of maize products averages 78' kg in -
rural a·reas and 4 8 kg in urI-?an are!!S (Elliott, 1991)>-In 1990, over _50 percent of bfac;k South 
Africans \Vere' residents-in rural areas. 'As in much ·of Southerii Africa, the conventiorial 
• " - ".·f'. ' ; • • · • ·. .- • ·,: {" ' . • I . • • 
wisdomis that co#.s.t!mers, particu_larly-those ~n·.urg.p.n.areas, pr9fer the more refmed. maize 
meal prodµcts., : '. - - ' ' - - ' - ,,. ":; - '· ' ' . -
The total domestjc market is abot1't 7.3_:.i~1illi01i tqnnes, with': M~izc :JJoard inUtke _ 
approxiniately 6.3--million tonne_s in a typfoa(ye~i{About 1 mi-Ilion tonnes are retained c~cii 
year by pr-oducers~ - _ · . _ - - ~-' >::'.:.,' ·: : - -_ - - . -. : -_ -- .. _ . 
Considerable work has been ~d011e _by Sq1itl~ Africau academics ~h price. and income 
elasticities for white·maiZe.-'_ Cadiz~(1984) an~· Yan Zyl (:1986), both' using country-wide 
data, found-that white uiaize meal had a~negative'income elasticity of dertmnd and therefor:e 
was_ an "iilferior" go9d.· _Estimation-of pric~ ela~J_i~!ties. revealed that demand was somewhat 
price insensitive: a ,10 percerit increase in prfoe\yc)uld only reduce quantity dema~1ded by 1.5 
to 3.3 perce;nt. · " ,. , 
These ear-Her results have ·been called into_.question by recentwork by Elliott (1991). -
By using consumption data,that only intJud~d .~lack consumers, he 'found that \vhite maize 
meal.was a "normal" good in that it had·a positive incmne· elasticity of demand in both fµral 
and urban are.as. Estimates of the- price elasticity of dema11d for m_aize meal were also mu.ch 
-higher than in ,previous studies;-. Elliott~ (-19Qt)has asserted that competition from other 
grains, primarily bre~d and rice,-have made:con_sumers, p__articular_ly those in urban areas, 
--much .more- sensitive to price changes .. A summary of recent estimates of price and income 
· elasticlti~s is presented hi Table 3. - _ ,':- - - !- - · -- · · - - -
-
- ) 
-_ ~-Tal)le 3: Estimates of White -Mruze M~atPrice and Income -
' -- Elasti~ities from Previous Studies -
/ 
- Cadiz -- Van Zyl 
.Ellio - --- '· -
- ' 
'(1984) (1986) -- (1991) - -
' ,, -- ' ' ' 
. Price elasticity for human --- ' -0.33 :-0.15 -0.70_ (~irban) 
" consumption " 
" 
~ 
-
-
ln,come elasticity for human ;.Q.38_ .:.030 0.06 (urban),· 
\ 
_,consumption. 0:20 (rural) :-: 
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In the last five years, marketing specialists a,t the Maize Board have been concerned 
about stagnant dema_nd for maize products. In recent· years, wheat bread and rice have. 
garnered a greater -share of the· cereals market at the expense· of .maize,. particularly in urban 
areas~ the convenience of bread and rice as urban "fast foods1' is widely thought to be . 
responsihle for this trend. The Maize Board fears a fall in future maize demand as a larger 
percentage of the blackSouth African.population ffiigrates to urban areas.· As a result, the 
Maize Board recently imple1i1ented a nationwide· advertising campaign. The theme of the 
im1rketing campaign, "The Maize Generation," is an effort to promote .maize consumption . 
. among. younger, urban consumers.. . 
v. Emerging policy issues in the South African maize subsecto~ 
As South Africa imdergoes the process of-political transformation, there will likely · 
he increased pressures to address the coexistence of food insecurity and large nationa! grain 
· stocks. In such an environment, the structure and performance of the maize· marketing 
sy§.tem wil'I undoubtedly become an is-Sue of major importance.: Additional questions arise, 
iricluding: In what sense can the experiences of other nations in the region inform -the 
, process of grain marketing reform in South Africa? 'VJmt can be expected to be the 
emergin.g policy issues in the maize subsector? Give~,"tl1e size of the South Africa,1 market, 
how will changes iri.. grain production und marketing policy affect ·its SA.DCC neighbors? -:'- . 
This_ section examines seve.ral emerging policy issues in the South African maize ) 
subsector. An attempt is made to draw on the experiences of other naJions in the region 
as well as identify areas in which approaches taken .in South Africa might contribute. to on- · 
going reforms elsewhere. · · 
The Demand for Yellow Maize and -Maize Board· Blending 
One of the more interesting developments in South African maize __ policy ·has: peen 
the increased reliance .on blending yellow a[ld white maize. A blend of 70 percent yellow 
maize and 30 percent white maize was .mandated _for the first time during the 1986/87 
marketing year due to drought. Given"th.e thin market.for white maize, domestic shortfalls 
must be met with imported yellow maize. In 1986/87 the Maize Board had limited white 
inaiZe stocks and directed that all millers prbduce .a blended product with se~ proportions. 
Shortfalls ~nwhite maize production also necessitated bleilding during both the 1990/91 and 
1991/92 marketing ye<lrs. ·However, during this period, the _proportion of yellow maize was -
much lower, about 15 percent yellow to 85 percent white ... Finally, due to the·severe drought 
and massive importation of yellow maize, the Maize Board anticipates blending <luring the 
.1992/93 marketing year for· as lonf as white inaize stocks permit. : · -" · ' . 
. , . There is consid~r~1ble consumer resistance to blended maize products. The objections . 
'" to yellow maize blends -include: 1) yellow maize is: for animal feed not human. consumption;. 
2) yellow maiZe causes upset stomachs and diarrhea; 3) colour a1_1d ·appearance are an· 
extremely importai1t element of "taste" as it is often said that "you eat with your eyes"; 4) 
yellow m~ize does·not keep as well after It is cooked and becomes quite bitter in taste after 
sitting for a while. In essence,· the J'narketing of blended maize products in S-outh Africa has 
beconie a political issue. · BJendfog. is v.iewed by many as emblematic of a government that 
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· has little concern for the preferences pf-the black majority. . 
· Due _to the unique political circumstances of_ South Africa, the largely~white 
controlled Maize Board has gon~ to great lengths to convince con~umers of maize tha,t the 
introduction of blended-maize products was a.necessary step in the _(ace of ~aize shortfalls. 
TI1e Mrize Board has undertaken a-public relations campaign to convince consumers that, 
"at least nutritionally, there is-virtually no_ differen,ce between yellow and white maize. In fact, 
yellow maize does have g~eater'aiimunts of carotene. Advice on improvedcooking~methods 
for blended maize products has also be-en disseminated. _ . . - - _ · . 
The actual "blending threshold"- of yellow maize is unclear. Apparently consumer . 
tests have revealed that consumers can (visual_ly) detect rel a Lively ·smalf amounts of yellow 
maize in a predomirtant!y white maize product (Elliott, -19,9.2). The M~tize Board has not 
attep1pte<l blindfolded taste tests to date. Aninforrna-i appraisal in Zimbabwe suggests ~hat 
_ a blend -of up to 30 percent yellow and 70 percent white still retains many .of the. 
characteristics of white mriize; but \vi th greater proportions of yellow maiZe, the distinc,tion. 
between a blended product and yellow niaize quickly becomes indistinguishable. .. . 
.. Clearly, there arc -advantages to the marketing of -blend~d. maize products, if \he . 
politic~! ramifications of promoting:. blended products .are ·addressed.- The potential.for 
· _ marketing blended products as a lower cost option to white n1aize might :be an option for 
other, mitions in Southeri1 ·Africa with a less charged politic~l enviro-mnent. Given the· 
significaiit levels o(rrialnutrition· that persis~,in the- region, tli~re rriay be opportunides to_ 
target low-income consumers by Sl;lbs{dizing bler:ided maize products in normal rainfall ye~n~: 
TI1e subsidy· could be adqiinistefe<l at -the milling stage and only apply to 2.5 kg bags in_-,· 
order- to reduce leakage to the stockfeed industry. A ma.rket outlet for yellow rriaize could , . 
· provide Southerni;\frican nations with added· flexibility in maize policy decisions. ~. 
Another interestin1f feature. of the South African maize meahnarket has been .post- -
processing enrichment._ In Southern and' Eas,tern Africa, the converitiqnaf wisdom is· that -
consumers pr<!°fer the mpre-refiried types :of maize. meal. Y ct' the nutridoiml value of the 
- .,,,.more tefirted meals can-be considerabty- l~ss than that of the "tniditional" unrefined meals .. · 
In South Africa, "special sifted" niaize ,meal, ·comprising over half of the 111arket, is often 
enriched with protein -and vitamins to replace losses during the milling" process~ However, 
there also have.been pockets of resistance-lo enrichment qf maize meal. lrUhe politically. 
charged _atfl!osphere of South 'Africa, iumcmrs have adsen that the enrichnient of inaize ·: 
:meal iS ~·government attempt to· reduce fertility._ It i~ not clear why enricl}ment-ha~ not ·~ 
receiVed wider ~ccept~nce ·inthe:rest-of the region. . 
·, • - - - • J . 
The Future Role of the. Maize Board - _ , 1 , 
In 1989, Sogth )\fric~-'s Minis-ter of Agriculture ·appointed a Coimnittce of Enquiry -
to examin·e ·maize marketing arrangements.· Declining real producer prices and iiicreased 
pressure for government contdbuticms to the Maize Board's stabilization fund had convinced', 
. many_ tha! there we~e "problems" in th71 maize industr:y (~ho{!i1ewald, 19S~). · In i10rmal_ 
-years, maize product10n ex:ceeds domestic demand, but smce wo_tld market pnces have be~n 
conside.rably aliove local prod1uce1~ prices, the Maize Board is often forced· to export at a 
loss. _Since stock~eeders are very sensitive to _changes in the: rela_tive prices of grnins, -
increasing the Maize Board,selling prices to compensate for exportJosses tends to i·esult in 
. . . . 
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·sharp drops-in -demand for maize from the stockfeeQ industry. Alternatively, the option':()f 
. lowering producer prices to export parity tends to encounter strong opposition from farmers' ' 
groups that cite rapidly increasing input costs. . , · 
. The Conunitt~e of Enquiry concluded' that the advantages. of a· single-channCl -
marketiJig system overshadowed. the disadv~ntages and recqmmended that the Maize Board. 
and its appqinted agents remain as_ sole._ buyer and sellers. In a review of the report .of tlie .. · 
.-Cmp.mittee of Enquiry, Qroenew_~Jd (-1989) states that the report did little to address ftiture. 
-· maize marketing needs and represented~ .missed .opportunity. Thus, to daie,- th~ ·mahi .. , 
policy thrust has been to increase the-flex.ibility of the Maize Board in the,rnanagement·of: 
its maize trading account. _ · . . . / . _ . , 
Yet given the on':going political reorientation of South Afrka, it is not inconeeival,>Je · 
that the ,Maize lloard.wiU soon face. a new mandate. With the_.advent of majority rule uL 
__ Zimbabwe.in -1980; the new gov~rnment embarked on.a major effort .to redress some of the: · -
: . inequities of the grain. marketing system.'The number o~parasta_tal d~pots rose: froth 3S to. 
.74, with most of the new depots located near communal farm ar~as. In 1988/89, a good ·- _ 
rainfall year, Zimbabwe's Grain Mai·keting Board also operated 53 temporary collect!on -
points from which grain was· purchased. Between f979 and 1985, smaJlholdcr ,maize 
production more than tripled (Rohrbach, 1989). Communal farmers were responsible for. 
ovei·_ half of all maize production and over a third of Grain Marketing Board intake. 
_ Rohrb.ach (1989) .attributes the growth in si11allholder production to a .complementary .set 
of changes hi agricultural policies, institµtions; and technologies. The changes include: 1) · 
a dra~natic rise in producer prices in the early l980's; 2') commitmeilt to strong .research a~d­
extension supp(.>rt; and 3) imprm;.ed access to credit, ir1put markets, and product markets. 
-. -However, despite these apparent advances, the lesson learned in Zimbab\v~ has been 
. ' - that incr.eased provision of marketing_ services to sma11holders is, at best, a mixed blessing 
(Jayne and Chis\10, 1991). Since the inajori_ty of smallholders iii semt-arid- farri1ing areas in 
, Southern Africa are net buyers of grainJ even with_ an infusi01i of institutional and technical 
· f support, investment in an extra,ctive grain_ marketing h1frastrncture may do little· for .fhe · 
majodty of.sm:illholders. A carefoJ cvafua(io·n of the effects of pursuing the Zimbabweah. · 
,, 'model of parastatal. development on tf1e food security-status of Sot1th African smallholders . 
in, marginal are~1s i~ required. H may-v.icil be that efforts- to ameliorate foou insecurity in ·. 
smallholder areas rests o·n the development ofa vibrai1t private grain tradin'g netwo(k that ' 
can coordinate Jhe·transport of grain from commercial farrnii1g areas, the processing of grain : 
at local hammer mills, and the distribution of packaged "straight-mn" meal to retail outlets.'' 
- . . .~. . . 
~' .· ' ' ' . 
Potei1tial Impacts of 'Maize Market Libera_lizution o~ Food ·Security 
. Jn Zimbabwe, recent . research hasr found that a .complex set of grain marketing.· 
. · 'regulations and movement rcslriCtions bave had an adverse effect of tbe food security st<\tus. 
: ~ · Qf rnml househ_olds (Jayne and· Chisvo, 1991). There .is also evidence. that this set of 
marketing restrictions and polic)1-induced constraints has restricted the'ability of small-scale. 
hammer millers loprovic!e urbdn.consqiners with a less costly and less refined maize meal 
product, thereby preserving the ·i11arkef share of a c9ucentrated industriai milling sector 
(Jayne and Ru bey, 1992). Evidence froin Zimbabwe suggests that the poor a're the. maiff 
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consumers of maize meal from. small hatilmer mills. . . . 
Many of the.sa~e peculiarities that le_d researchersin_ Zimbabwe to parti~lly attribute 
rural and urba·n household food insecurity to a. restrictive. maiztnim:rketing system exist in 
South Africa.· ·n1e "food insecurity paradox" of the l980's in. Zimbabwe mirrors the ~outh 
AfricaP experie.nce very closely .. Th.e stark duality of the agricultural.sector in So~th Africa 
dwarfs even that 9f Zimbabwe. Maize pr:oduction and ·1imrketing is dominated. by large 
·commercial fanners· in the favorable · agro-ecological zones. The vast· ,majority · of · 
smallholders live on marginal htnds ailc.1 are dependent to s¢me extent on .n01~-agriculttiral 
earnings iand remittances. . \ . ,· - . . . . < . ~ • . . f '. . 
· 'D1ere is anec<lot~l .evidence of" a strong seaso~ml pallern t9 commercial s_ales of 
maize-meaL Because of own-production in smallholder areas, sales of commel'cial maize· 
ffi:eUl drop off..at harvest; Maize produced by smallholders· .is either ground by harid or 
milled at a local hammer mill. As the ~narketing year ·progresses and rural sniallholders run · 
out of grain, sales gradually starMo·pic~:up. Corilinercial inillers in Soutl1 Africa speak of 
this slack period after_.harve_si -as the time when ·~'the market has: not started lo run." 
Fu_rthcrmore, Maize. Boar.d officiais h;,ive acJ~nmvledged thatc the Iloarg ·does not make 
. - provisions for "ultra~small buyers." . _ : · · . . 
·---,.. . Although a fini1 'conclrrsion awaits further. research and solid empirical evidence, it . ". 
· is hypothesized ~hat the prohibilioris against- a private grain trade and the . apparent · 
unidirectlonaUlow.of.grain from producing areas into the Maize Board and the commerd~l · 
ipllling system have had negative·impacts on rural households in lnarginal fat.ming areas that. 
are net buyers of grain.· The large milling m·arghis in the commer~iaLmilling sector wouid .. · 
indicate that a ·locally~niilled "straight-run" meal could be made available ata considerably ' 
lmver price than ~cmpmerdally-prod~ced maize meal. ' . ' . 
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